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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VINCENT DYKES, by and through
Neil F'arrell Dykes, his Guardian ad
Litem,
Plaintiff,

-vs.RELIABLE F'URNITURE
CARPET COMPANY,

&

Defendant and ThirdParty Plaitntiff and
Respondp,nt,

Case No. 8179

-vs.WALKER :M:ANUFACTURING
COMPANY,
Third Party Defenda;nt
and Appellant.
-j

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In order to avoid confusion, we will adopt the procedure followed by the appellant and will refer to the
parties as they are designated in the pleadings filed in
the Lower Court.
Plaintiff, a minor, brought this action against the
Reliable Furniture and Carpet Company to recover for
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personal injuries alleged to have been received in a fall
from a baby crib sold by the defendant Reliable Furniture and Carpet Company to the minor's parents. It is
alleged that the crib was defective and that the defect
W8JS the cause of the plaintiff's fall and injuries.
Defendant, after securing permission of the court
to do so, filed a third party complaint against the Walker
Manufacturing Company, the manufacturer of the crib.
While not admitting that the baby crib was defective, defendant alleged that if the same was defective, the defect was not apparent and was the fault of the Walker
Manufacturing Company, from whom the crib was purchased by the defendant (R. 2-4). The third party summons and complaint was served upon Harland Fredrickson in the State of Utah, who it is claimed is the agent for
the Walker Manufacturing Company in this state (R. 7).
The third party defendant has moved to dismiss the
third party complaint upon the grounds that service upon
Harland Fredrickson does not constitute valid service
upon the Walker Manufacturing Company (R. 8).
Rule 4 (e) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provide for service of. summons as follows :
"Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise
provided for, upon a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy
thereof to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to
receive service and the statute so requires, by also
mailing a copy to the defendant. If no such officer
2
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or agent can be found in the county in which the
action is brought, then upon any such officer or
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief
clerk, or other agent having the management, direction or control of any property of such corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the state. If no such officer or
agent can be found in the state, and the defendant
has, or advertises or holds itself out as having,
an office or place of business in this state, or does
business in this state, then upon the person doing
such business or in charge of such office or place
of business."
Rule 4 (e) (10) provides :
"Upon a natural person, nonresident of the
state of Utah, doing business in this state at one
or more place of business, as set forth in Rule 17
(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant
personally or to one of his managers, superintendents or agents."
The court denied the third party defendant's motion
to dismiss the third party complaint. This appeal is
taken from the court's ruling in this regard. The question presented is: Is the service upon Harland Fredrickson sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the Walker
Manufacturing Company upon the court~
The appellant attempts to raise another issue, which
is: "Said third party complaint states no claim and presents no issue upon which relief could be granted against
said third party defendant in favor of said third party
plaintiff."
This issue should not be considered by this court on
this appeal for the reason that it was never submitted
3
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to the Trial Court. The 1notion which was filed by the
third party defendant-and which was denied by the District Court appears on page 3 of its brief and is as follows:
"To dismiss the third party action or in lieu.
thereof to quash the return of service of the third
party summons on the grounds (a) that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the person of said third
party defendant, and (b) that said third party defendant has not been properly served with process in this action, all of which more clearly appears in the affidavits of Sam Walker and Harland Fredrickson hereto annexed as Exhibit "A"
and Exhibit "B", respectively." (R. 8).
Thus it was seen that the second point raised by the
appellant in his brief was never presented to the District Court and should be denied or not even considered
by this court upon that basis. However, since the issue
has been raised in appellant's brief, we will discuss the
same herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The fundamental question involved is whether or
not Harland Fredrickson is the agent of the Walker
Manufacturing Company in this state, upon whom service
of summons may be made. His deposition has been taken
and discloses the following:
The Walker Manufacturing Company manufactures
infant furniture, including baby cribs (Dep. 5). It manufactures the same line of products which was formerly
manufactured by the Tyre Manufacturing Company and
then the Walker Manufacturing Company for a number
4
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of years. Although Harland Fredrickson has no formal
written agreement with the company, he, at the time of
the service of summons upon him was the only representative of the Walker Manufacturing Company in the
State of Utah (Dep. 12). On page 7 of the deposition,
Mr. Fredrickson testified as follows:

"Q.

A.

Not referring to this particular transaction
but just to a transaction generally, you did
represent the Walker Manufacturing Company in January 19531

Yes.

Q. And you did represent them during the year
1952. Is that correct 1
A.

Yes.

Q. And how many years back does that representation go 1
A.

Well, originally the company, or not this
company in particular, was known as the
Tyre Manufacturing Company. However,
they decided here several years back to manufacture other items, and Mr. Walker had financing through the Tyre company, and he
decided to manufacture these cribs; and up
until the first of-well, let's see-I would
imagine about the first of February the manufacturing company was known as Tyre.

Q.

The first of February of what year1

A.

Of this year."

Upon inquiry to the company from a person in this
area, Mr. Fredrickson's name would be furnished by the
company as the company's representative (Dep. 10). On

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

page 10 of the deposition, he testified :
"Q. Does the Walker Manufacturing Company or
did the company that preceded it, the Tyre
company, furnish the people in the State of
Utah such as the Reliable Furniture & Carpet
Company who might buy their products the
name of their representatives in various
states!
A.

I would imagine so.

Q. Did they furnish them your name as a representative of the company!
A. Well, it would happen in this case. If they
should write the company and ask them who
represented them or who had the pictures and
so forth in order to show them what they
manufactured, they would give my name.

Q. And that would be true of the Reliable Furniture & Carpet Company or any other company that happened to write the company and
ask who represented them in this state. Is
that correct~
A.

Well, that's right.

Q. Do they have any other representatives in
this state other than yourself!
A. No.
Q. And is your territory or your field in which
you may represent them limited to the State
of Utah!
A.

Would you repeat that, please!

Q. Is your territory or the locality in which you
represent them limited to the State of Utah T
A. No, it's unlimited. I could sell in New York
if I wan ted to."
6
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Continuing on
"Q. Do
the
the

A.

page 12, Mr. Fredrickson testified:
you have the exclusive right to represent
Walker Manufacturing Company here in
State of Utah~

I don't have that in writing, no. He could
have somebody else up here tomorrow without ever telling me about it. Of course, that
is not a normal business procedure, but-

Q. Is it your understanding that you do have an
exclusive right to represent them~
A.

No, it isn't even that, because I can send his
pictures and prices back to him and tell him
I don't want to represent him any longer, and
he can do the same thing for me.

Q. I mean as long as the relationship continues
on a friendly basis, as long asA.

It would be assuming that I was his-the only
person selling in this area for him, yes.

Q. And would that same practice have prevailed
during the time that it was known as the Tyre
Manufacturing Company~
A.

Yes."

Although he represents a number of other companies, he does not represent any other company selling
the same items as the Walker Manufacturing Company
(Dep. 28), and believes that the company would object to
his representing another company and not allow him to
represent it further (Dep. 27).
The company furnished him with catalogues, brochures, pictures of the items they sold, price lists and
order blanks (Dep. 5-6). He contacts prospective retail

7
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outlets such as defendant Reliable Furniture & Carpet
Company, furnishes then1 with catalogues and other materials and shows them pictures of the items offered
for sale. Assuming he is successful, he will take an order
for the particular items desired, quoting the prices shown
on the price lists (Dep. 17-18). This order will generally
be taken on one of the company's order blanks and will
then be forwarded to the company.
The items ordered will be shipped directly from the
company to the purchaser at the prices quoted by Ftedrickson from the price lists. A notice that the item has
been shipped, showing the price charged, is sent to Harland Ftedrickson (Dep. 19-20). At the close of each
month, the company forwards him a commission of six
percent on all sales during the preceding period. He receives this commission on all sales made by the company
in this area, whether the order was taken by him personally or not (Dep. 26).
The witness is kept advised of the status of the various accounts, and in the event of a delinquency has authority to speak to the customers about such delinquent
accounts (Dep. 23). In the event payment was forthcoming, he would suggest that payment be forwarded directly to the company, but does feel that he might accept
payment and forward the same to the company (Dep.

37).
In the event complaints were made about any of the
items sold by the company, he would go to the customer
registering the complaint, with a representative of the
store which sold the item (Dep. 38), 1nake an investiga-

8
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tion of the cmnplaint and forward a report of the srune
to the company (Dep. 13 and 38). The stores to whom
Harland Fredrickson sells, when they have a request
for items which they do not have on hand, sold by the
Walker Manufacturing Company, generally arrange
among themselves to secure the items from one another;
however, according to the witness, they could call the
witness and he would refer them to another store where
they might be able to obtain the desired item.
I~

n:

As to his authority to make adjustments, Mr. Fredrickson testified on Page 13:
"Q. Now, did the Walker Manufacturing Company have any service men in the State of
Utah who serviced their products~

A.

No.

Q.

If there were a particular item which they
~old and the item happened not to be up to
par, would there be anybody in the State of
Utah whom they would call and have come
and look over the equipment~

A.

Well, in the event that some particular mechanism or crib panel or crib side or what have
you proved dissatisfactory, the company
would normally write to them for replacement; and in the event that there was some
discrepancy, the company would probably
write me and tell me to go examine it or inspect it and ascertain what the damage was
in that regard. That would be the only thing.

Q.

Would you have any authority in such circumstances to make an adjustment~

A.

No, I couldn't make any adjustment of any

n.

ill·
nl

].
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kind. All I could do was write the factory as
to what I found, and then they would make
the adjustment that they felt was satisfactory
to both parties.
Q.

If you found the equipment to be defective,
could you pick the equipment up and send it
hack to the factory and have the factory send
a replacement without writing-

A.

It is never handled like that. In the event
that the part was faulty, the normal course
would be for the store to return it, or reorder a particular part, and when they received it, return the faulty one."

And on Page 15 he testified :
"Q. Do you go on behalf of the Walker Manufacturing Company when there are complaints about their equipment to the home of
the individual or to the store and make an inspection¥
A.

I would go to the store only, and I would only
go with one of the representatives of the store
to look at the Inerchandise because, you see,
I can never go to a person's home and look
over some damaged merchandise by myself.

Q. And after you have looked over this damaged
merchandise, would you then make a report
of your findings to the company¥
A.

Q.

Well, see, as I say, that's the only thing I can
do because I'm not authorized to make arepair of any kind.
If you decide that the particular fault that
happened to exist in this particular product
that you went to examine was not by reason
of its faulty manufacture, would you then

10
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have to report it to the company, or could you
just inform them of your findings 1
A.

Well, all I would do is tell them what I found
and let them draw their own conclusions.

Q.

Tell who¥

A.

Mr. Walker."

As to his procedure generally in representing the
company in respect to sales, Mr. Fredrickson testified on
Page 19:
"Q. And the person who bought the crib would
order a specific crib. Is that correct 1
A.

That's right.

Q.

And on your order blank you would specify
the particular crib that they wanted to buy¥

A.

That's right.

Q. And you send that in to the company. Is that
correct!
A.

That's right.

Q.

Now, what would happen after you sent this
order to the company 1

A.

Well, most of the factory's shipments are
based, of course, on orders or a back log of
orders as they call it. As they receive an
order, they place it on either the bottom of a
file or top and, anyway, they work in sequence. They receive an order one day, and
the order is scheduled for shipment the same
day if there are no other orders preceding it,
and then the item is boxed, packaged, and
shipped directly to the party who ordered it.

Q.

Now, the crib that you sold then would be

11
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shipped directly to the party who ordered the
crib. Is that correct~
A.

Oh, I would probably receive a notice, yes.

Q. And what would happen with regard to the
billing~ Would you receive a bill for the crib'~

A.

No.

Q. Would the person to whom you sold it receive
that hill~
A.

Yes."

As to his authority to make collections, Mr. Fredrickson testified on Page 21:

"Q. You get that notice, and do you have any
follow-up to ascertain whether or not the
cribs are paid for~
A.

In the event that they weren't paid for within a certain length of time, I would act at my
own discretion. In other words, when you are
selling a man something, he is a customer of
yours, and you have got to determine which
of those people you can approach and which
you can't. It's a little insulting to ask a man
for money at the time you are asking them for
an order, so that is entirely up to the person's
discretion. I am aware, however, of their
current condition as far as payment is concerned, but that is a standard practice by all
factories and manufacturers.

Q. And it is a standard practice of the Walker
Manufacturing Company and prior to that
the Tyre Manufacturing Company. Is that
correct~

A.

Oh, yes.
12
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Q.

Now, if an account becan1e delinquent, would
you go to the account and ask them about
their delinquent account~

A.

I never have.

Q.

Well, whether you have or not, would that fall
within the scope of your authorization if you
-in other words, let me put it this way:
Suppose you sold-

A.

The only person that can really logically ask
for payment is the company themselves or
the company's direct paid representatives.
Now, you would fall in that category in the
event that son1e party refused to pay; then
the only thing they could do would be to obtain counsel.

Q. I'm not interestedA.

That is, an attorney.

Q. -in this deposition in what the company can
or can't do. All I am interested in is what you
do .
A.

No, I can't do that. I can go and ask them,
suggest to them that they pay their bill, and
I can in no circumstance demand or insist
that they pay it."

As to the manner in which he was paid, he testified
on Page 24:
"A. I am paid a commission on all shipments.

Q.

And does that commission vary from item to
item~

A.

No, it's the same commission.

Q.

Can you tell us what that commission

wa~

13
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during 1952 at the time you worked for the
TyreA.

Six per cent.

Q.

And what is it with Walker Manufacturing
Company~

A.

Six per cent.

Q.

Now, when would that be paid~ By that I
mean would it Le paid to you immediately
upon sending in the order blank~

A.

No, that's paid on a monthly basis.

Q.

Now, would it make any difference when you
were paid whether or not the person from
whom you had solicited the order paid for it?

A.

That's right.

Q. In other words, you wouldn't be paid until
he had paid for the order that you had solicited~

A.

No, I am paid as soon as the order is shipped.
You see, the dating is two per cent ten days
as far as the company is concerned. The dating is two per cent ten days, which means that
if the company that received the shipment
paid for it in ten days, they would receive a
two per cent discount.

Q. And most of them do pay within ten days¥
A.

Ordinarily, but then the terms are two per
cent net thirty, and in thirty days when the
account is due and payable they pay the net
amount rather than the two per cent.

Q.

Suppose that a company from whom you had
solicited an order on behalf of Walker Manufacturing Company or before that the Tyre

14
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Manufacturing Company failed to pay for the
particular items which were included in that
order. Would you receive a commission on
those particular items~
A.

Yes.

Q.

Regardless of whether they pay for them or
not~

A.

That's right.

Q.

You receive your commission~

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

So your commission is six per cent of the cost
of the items on the orders solicited regardless
of whether or not they are paid for or not~
A. That's right.
Q. Now, do you have a discretion J,s to deciding
who is a good credit risk or who isn't a good
credit risk~
A. Yes, I am the sole judge.
Q. In other words, you can refuse to sell to certain people, or you can decide to sell to other
people~

A.

That's right. To decide is more accurate
there. As far as refusing a sale is concerned,
no, I can't. If the particular company that
I haven't called on decides that they wanted
to buy something from them, they would go
ahead and do it, and it would be up to the
discretion of the factory whether or not they
wanted to ship them."

As to his authority to arrange for transfers of goods
from one store to another in an emergency, Mr. Fredrickson had this to say: (Page 31)

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Q.

Now, do you ever have the situation arise
in which maybe somebody needs something
in a hurry, and one of your customers happens to have that particular item, and another customer doesn't have that particular
item and has a need for it, do you ever go to
the one customer and pick that item up from
that customer and take it over to the other
customerf

A.

No. Something like that is handled between
stores. In other words, if one of the stores
here on Main Street was out of a particular
item, they might know who else sold the same
thing, and they would simply call them up
and say, 'Joe, I need such and such. Have
you got it to spare~'

Q.

Do they ever call you and ask if you know
where they can get such and such~

A.

Oh, no.

Q.

In other words, if they wanted to find out
what other store in town handled the same
equipment that they handle so they could call
them and get it from them, would they ever
call you and ask you who was handling this
equipmentf

A.

They might, but it isn't likely.

Q.

Has that ever happened during the course of
your time you have represented the Walker
Manufacturing Company~

A.

No.

Q.

Did that ever happen while you were representing the Tyre Manufacturing Company~

A.

No. Quite possibly during the war that hap-

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pened, but it certainly never happened while
I have been working."
Summarizing the testimony, Mr. Fredrickson testified on Page 33 :
"Q. Now, I would like - let me ask you a question
which is more or less of a summation, and ask
you if it is true, or if it is not true, in which
way it is not true. Do you see what I mean~
I understand your relationship with the
Walker Manufacturing Company and before
that the Tyre Manufacturing Company to be
what you term as a manufacturer's representative. Is that correct~
A. Yes.
Q. And you are empowered, speaking particularly now of the Walker Manufacturing Company and Tyre Manufacturing Company before, you are authorized- you are furnished
by that company pictures and specifications,
catalogs and brochures of the particular
equipinent the company has sold~
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you are also furnished a list of the prices
of the particular equipment~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you are also furnished order blanks with
the name of the company on the order blank
and printed by the company itself. Is that
correct~

A.

Well, yes, but-

Q.

You wouldn't necessarily have to take your
orders on it~
A. No.

17
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Q. But you are furnished those order
A.

blanks~

That's right.

Q. Are you furnished any other statione_ry besides order blanks~
A.

No.

Q.

Then you would go to the particular customer
that you felt that you might make a sale, and
you would show him the brochures and the
pictures of this equipment sold by the Walker
Manufacturing Company or before that the
Tyre Manufacturing Company. Is that cor.
re.ct?

A.

Yes.

Q. And you would tell them the price of the particular equipment that you were showing
them~

A. Yes.

Q. And if they desired to purchase that particular equipment, then you would make out an
order ordinarily on the form published by the
company. Is that correct?
A.

.

Well, it just depends; would depend more on
what I had rather than on the company's
form.

Q. But you would fill out this order then,
whether it was on the company's order form
or not~
A. Yes.

Q. And you would send this order direct to the
Walker Manufacturing Company or prior to
that the Tyre Manufacturing Company~
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A.

Yes.

Q.

In California. Now, as I understand it, they
would ship the material that you specified
on the order blank to the particular company.
Is that correct~

A.

The correction there would be what the dealer specified, not what I specified.

Q. What the dealer had specified to you and you
had put down on the order blank~
A.

That's right.

Q. And they would ship that direct to the person
involved. Is that correct~
A.

Yes.

Q. And they would-it has been your experience
that they would ship it at the price that you
quoted~

A.

Well, that would be the price that they furnished me with.

Q.

That's correct, but it is the price that the
Walker Manufacturing Company furnished
you with which you quoted to the consumer~

A.

That's right.

Q. And at the time they shipped this material,
they would send you some kind of a notice
that the material had been shipped. Is that
correct~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the notice that it had been shipped would
include in the notice a statement of the price
of the particular items. In other words, the
price would be-the cost would be upon this
notice~
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A.

That's right.

Q.

Now, the Walker Manufacturing Company
and before that the Tyre Manufacturing Company paid you six per cent of the sale price
of the equip1nent that you sold. Is that correct~

A.

Yes.

Q. And that was true regardless of whether or
not the consumer paid for it or not~
A.

That's right.

Q. And the company would in addition to that
pay you six per cent of every order that was
sent in for their equipment from the State
of Utah, even though you yourself had not
solicited the particular order~
A.

That's right. Can I make a correction

there~

Q. Yes, you may.
A.

When you say that I receive six per cent on
all orders, that simply means that the order
is shipped from the factory in good faith, and
the company pays for it, then you see that
is fine. That is simply entered on their credit
books; but in the event that the company
doesn't pay for it, I would already have received my commission, but if the account
proved faulty, then they would deduct the
commission from that amount.

Q.

From other amounts that might be due to you.
Is that it~

A.

No. If there was no way of collecting it, they
would deduct the commission from that.
And what would they do with the rest of it~

Q.
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A.

Well, the rest of it, you see, I would have to
stand good for selling a customer who
wouldn't pay as well as the company.

Q.

In other words, the company would lose
everything but the commission, and you would

A.

Yes, that's right. They would stand behind
lose the commission~
that loss, and I would have to stand behind
the loss of the con1mjssion.

Q.

Now, on small amounts, accounts of two or
three hundred dollars-and we are still talking about the Walker Manufacturing Company and the Tyre Manufacturing Company,
your authority for them-if one of your consumers did not pay a bill, then, of course,
you would have a discretion as to whether or
not you might go around and talk to them
about paying the bills~

:MR. HENDERSON:
or stating it~

Q. Well is that

Are you asking a question

correct~

A.

Well, yes.
because I
quested by
It is a case
tions.

It's only at my own discretion
am neither authorized nor rethe company to do these things.
of cementing good business rela-

Q.

Could you go to the company and make some
kind of a provision for payment~ In other
words, suppose the company owed-a consumer owed three hundred dollars, and you
went to them. Could you arrange that they
might pay that off a:t the sum of twenty-five
dollars per month~
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A.

No, only the company-that arrange1nent can
be made only between the two c01npanies.

Q.

Could you discuss such an arrangement and
then submit it to the company for approval1

A.

No.

Q.

Could you, if you went there and they said,
'Yes, we owe the company three hundred dollars, we have neglected to pay it, but here is
the three hundred dollars,' could you accept
'the three hundred dollars~

A.

I would suggest that they mail it to them. I
could take it and mail it myself, but it would
only be a case of my doing it instead of them,
my put~ing a six cent stamp on an envelope
instead of them doing it, because that
wouldn't accomplish anything. You can realize that.

Q.

Now, you have never received any complaints
from the customers or the customers' customers about any of the equipment that you
have sold for Walker Manufacturing Company or before that the Tyre Manufacturing
Company. Is that correct 1

A.

That's true, yes.

Q.

Now, it is your practice with these other companies that you represent that if you do receive complaints that you you go to the customers, your customer's store and look over
the equipment. Is that correct~

MR. HENDERSON: I object to tha:t. That's not
his testimony, Mr. Hanson. It is suggesting,
leading, and I object to the form of the question.
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Do you want to tell me what you can do if
you receive a complaint about some of this
stuff that you sell?
A. I believe that you will find a little bit further
on that you asked this same question, and I
told you at that time that I could only go to a
customer's home, that is, a retail customer's
home with representatives of the store or,
that is, not one of their employe~es but one of
the owners, and inspect it and then tell the
factory exactly what I found, because I have,
no authorization to recommend any change
in tlie merchandise whatsoever. The only
ones that can do it, it is between the two companies."
Q.

We have only quoted the most pertinent parts of
the deposition a;s to the points involved. A reading of
the entire deposition will disclose other testimony supporting third party plaintiff's position, which we have
not set out herein.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY DID NOT
ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT TO DISMISS THE THIRD PARTY ACTION UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF SAID THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND
THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS VOID.

POINT NO. II.
SAID THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT DID STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED TO
THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY DID NOT
ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT TO DISMISS THE THIRD PARTY ACTION UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF SAID THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND
THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS VOID.

While as stated in Parke-Davis Co. v. Fifth Judicial
Court in Glnid for Beaver County, 93 Utah 217, 72 P2 466:
"The mere solicitation and obtaining of orders within a store by the agent of a foreign corporation, for goods to be shipped into the state
to the purchaser, does not amount to doj_ng business within the state so as to render the corporation amenable to service of process therein."
Very little more than mere solicitation is required
to bring about this result.
As stated in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S.
A.P. D.C., 129, 134 F2 511 of 146 ALR 926:
"The tradition crystallized when it was
thought that nothing less than concluding contracts could constitute 'doing business' by foreign
corporations, an idea now well exploded. It is
now recognized that maintaining many kinds of
regular business activity constitutes 'doing business' in 'the jurisdictional sense, notwithstanding
they do not involve concluding contracts. In other
words, the fundamental principle underlying the
(doing business) concept seems to be the maintenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, continuous c'ourse of business activities, whether or
not this includes the final stage of contracting.
Consequently, it is clear that if, in addition to a
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regular course of solicitation, other business activities are carried on, such as maintaining a warehouse, making deliveries, etc., the corporation is
'present' for jurisdictional purposes. And very
little more than 'mere solicitation' is required to
bring about this result." (Italics their'S).

,~.

Thus, 'in the case of Wabash Railroad Co. v. District
Court, Salt Lake County, 109 Utah 526, 167 P2 973, where
a railroad company which had no tracks west of the Missouri River mainltained an office in Salt Lake City for
the convenience of its general agent and assistant clerks
and where the employees' only func'tion was to solicit
shipments of freight by way of the Wabash Railroad
from customers in the State of Utah; the employees
having no authority to issue tickets, bills of lading, receipts, or t'O collect money, it was held that the corporation was doing business in the State of Utah.
And in the case of Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah 58, 110
P. 556, the court held that the solicitation of freight busines's in the State of Utah, coupled wifu the maintenance
of an office and an office force in this state, was doing
business, even though the agent of the railroad company
in the state had no power to bind the corporation in any
of its business affairs.
In the c;a:se of Industrial Commission v. J(emmerer
Coal Co., 106 Ultah 476, 370 P2 373, the defendant, a Wyoming corporation, maintained an office in the State of
Utah, on the door of which its name was printed; was
listed in the telephone directory and all of the expenses
of the office were paid by the defendant. The three
employees who used that office solicited sales of coal
25
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to consumers in the State of Utah; it was likewise held
that the corpora!tion was doing business in the State of
Utah.
In a leading cas·e, International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, the company's transactions in the
State of Kentucky were conducted in accordance with the
following order directed to persons negotiating sales for
the company in the S'tate of Kentucky:
"The company's transactions hereafter with
the, people of Kentucky must be on a strictly interstate commerce basis. Travelers negotiating
sales must not hereafter have any headquarters
or place of business in that state, but may reside
'there.
"Their authority must be limited to taking
orders, and all orders must be taken subj·ect to
the approval of the general agent outside of the
S'tate, and all goods mus't be shipped from outside of the state after the orders have been approved. Travelers do not have authority to make
a contract of any kind in the state of Kentucky.
They merely itJake orders to be submitted to the
general agent. If anyone in Kentucky owes the
company a debt, they may receive the money,
or a check or a draft for the same, but they do not
have any rauthority tO make .any allowancer or compromise any disputed claims. When a matlter cannot be s·ettled by payment of the amount due, the
matter mus't be ·submitted to the general collecltion
agent, as the case may he, for adjustment, and
he can give the order as to what allowance or
what compromise may be accepted. All conltracts
of sale must be made f.o. b. from some point outside of Kentucky, and the goods become the property of the purchaser when they are delivered to
1

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the carrier outside of the sta'te. Notes for the purchase price may be taken, and they may be made
payable at any hank in Kentucky. All contracts
of any and every kind made with the people of
Ken'tucky must be made outside of thaJt state, and
they will be contracts gorverned by the laws of the
various states in which we have general agencies
handling interstate business with the people of
Kentucky. F'or example, contracts (585) made by
the general agent at Parkersburg, W·est Virginia,
will be West Virginia contracts.
"If any one of the company's general agents
deviates from what is stated in this letter, the
result will he just the same as if all of them had
done so. Anything that is done that places the
company in the position where it can be held as
having done business in Kentucky will not only
make the man transaeting the business liable to a
fine of from $100.00 to $1,000.00 for each offense,
but it will make the company liable for doing business in the state without complying with the requirements of the laws of the state. We will
therefore depend upon you to se1e that these instructions are strictly carried out."
The court held that 'the mere solici'ta'tion of sales,
coupled with a continuous course of business within the
state was sufficient to confeT jurisdiction on the State
of Kentucky and said:
"Here was a continuous course of business in
the solici'tation of orders which were g,ent to another s1tate, and in response to which the machine's of the Harvester Company were delivered
within the State of Kentucky. This was. a oourse
of business, not a single transaction. The agents
not only s·ol'icited orders ( 586) in Kentucky, but
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might there rece~ve payrnent in money, checks,
or drafts. They might take notes of customers,
which notes were made payable, and doubtless
were collected, at any bank in Kentucky. This
course of conduct of authorized agents within the
state in our judg1nenrt constituted a doing of business th€re in such wise that the Harvester Company might be fairly said to have been the!re, do-ing business, and amenable to the process of the
courts of the state."
I 1t i:s to be noited that the agent's authority under
the cit:ed order or metllod of do'ing business is synonymous with the agent's .authority in the matter now under.
cornsiderati'on.
A case particularly in point is the. case of International Shoe Company v. State, et al (Wash.), decided
January 4, 1945, 154 P2 801. In that case the International Shoe Company employed eleven to thirteen sal'esmen who re1sided in the State of Washington and were
regularly engaged therein in soliciting orders and displaying sampl1e,s, someltimes in permanenlt display rooms,
which were paid for by the salesmen, for which expense
they were reimbursed by the company. Quoting from the
case:
"The authority of the salesmen is limited to
exhibiting to merchants who are probably buyers
samples of merchandise for wlrich they solicit orders, endeavoring to procure orders on prices
.and terms fiX'ed by appellant. If orders are obt,ained, ifue salesmen transmit them to appellant's
office in St. Louis, for acceptance or rejection.
If the orders. are accepted by appellant, the merchandise called for by such orders is shipped
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f.o.b. shipping point, from outside the state of
W ashingt'on. No sralesman has authority to bind
appellant with any contract, or to finally conclude
any transacti~on in its behalf, nor can he make
collections. Sal,esmen are not permiltted 1to engage
in an independently established trade occupation,
professiion, or business of the s'ame nature as is involved in their ·employment by appellant."
The court held ~hat se,rvice of summons on orne of
the salesman was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the tribunals of the State of \V ashington, and said:
"The cases deraling with the questliorn herre
presented are multitudinous. While it is probably
true that mos1t of the cases which hold the corporation was doring business in the state: so as to make
it am.enable to process have some slight activity
on the part of the agenrt in addit:i!on to the solicitation of orders resutting in a con'tinuous flow of
the corporatiron's products into the state, yet it
seems to us the basic fact upon which the courts
have determined that the corporation was doing
business was the regular and systema:tic solicitation of orders by the agent, resulting in the continuous fl.o,w of the corporation's products into the
state by means of interstate carriers.
"The following are typicral cases holding that
the corporation was doing business in the state
where service was attempted to be made. Fvom
our discussion of these caS'es will appear what
facts, in addition to mere solicitation, the courts
considered in determining that the corpora:tion
was doing business in the state. It will also a ppear f~om some of the decisions that a regular
and systematic course of solicitation of orders
by the agent of the corporation, resulting in a continuous flow rof the corporation's product's into the
29
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staJte should be and is sufficient to warrant the
court in holding the corporation was doing business in the state." (Italics theirs.)
The following is f·ound in 113 A.L.R. 88:
"In a grea;t majority of the cases in which the
question has been presented, the courts have sustained the validity of service of process upon a
sales agent or solicitor for a foreign corporation
doing business in the state.
"Thus service of summons upon a salesman of
a foreign corporation who took orders for its
goods from retail merchants was held to be valid
under a statute authorizing service on 'any officer or agent of such a corporation within this
state.' Genack v. Gorman, (1923) 224 Mich. 79,
194 NW 575.
"And ~an agent with authority to solicit orders
for goods to be shipped from outside the state,
and who was designated by the corporation's officials as its 'western representative', was held to
be an agent of the corporation upon whom proeess
could be served." Kirby v. Louismann-Capen Co.,
(1914; D.C.) 221 F. 267.

* * *
"A local agent employed by a foreign automobile manufacturing to take orders for cars on
blank forms furnished by ·the company, on which
the agent's name appeared as salesman, who took
checks payabl·e to the company in payment for
the cars, and received compensation on a commission basis, was held to he an agent of the corporation, upon whom process could be s·erved." R. M.
Owen & Co. v. Johnson (1913) 184 Ill. App. 90.
30
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Ill

"An employee of a foreign corporation who,
in addHion to soliciting orders f'or the corporations' goods, subject to a.pproiV'al by the eorporation in ano1ther state and shipments from the other
state, a1s'O made collections, adjusted claims, filled
orders by se-curing goods from other purchasers,
and kept s'ome of the corporations' goods in stock
aJt his home for immediate delivery, was held to
be an agent under whom process could be served
unde'r a statute authorizing service upon ''any officer or agent of such corporation' and providing
that any pers,on representing such 'a c'orporotion
in any eapacity should be deemed an 'agent' within
the meaning of the s'tatute-." Cheli v. Cudahy Bros.
Co. (1932) 20 Mich. 496, 245 NW 503.
"One who, in solici'ting orde,rs for t'he product
of a for~eign corporation, eonsulted wi1th the eorpo- .
ration ~and undertook to remedy defects when the
equipment sold did not function properly, install-_,
ed such equipment with other emp1o~ees of the
corporati,on who came for the purpose of correcting such difficulties, and purchased fabricated
materials in the state for use in attempts to
remedy defects, was held to, be an agent upon
whom process could be served, under a statute
auifuorizing service upon any officer or agent of a
£oreign corpor,ation, and providing that any person representing such a corporation in any capacity silrould be deemed an agent." Malooly v. New
York Heating atnd Ventilating Corp. (1935) 270
M'ich. 240, 258 NW 622 (appeal dism:i:ssed in
1935); 296 U.S. 533, 80 L. Ed. 379; 56 S. Ct. 92,
which bad re!hearing denied in 1935; 296 U.S. 662;
80 L. Ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 166.)

* * *
"A

pers~on

who solicited business fior a

f!o~-
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eign building and loan association, receipted for
and re1nitted installments, dues and fine1s on a
commission basis, and was held out by the corpoI'Iation as its agent at the place where he was
served, was held to be the 'resident agent' of the
eorporation upon whom process might be served."
Pollock v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan Assoc.
(1896) ; 48 S.C. 65; 25 S.E. 977; 59 Am. St. Rep.
695.

* * *
"A traveling salesman who solici'ted orders
for goods on behalf of a foreign corporat~on, to
be shipped from another state, subject to approval
by the corporaJtion at its home office in such state,
was held to he an agent upon who~m process could
he serv-ed in an action against the corpor,ation."
Harbich v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. (1932 D.C.)
11 F. Supp. 63.
"And service upon an agent of a foreign corporation whos:e duties were to solicit sales of the
eorporat~on's products throughout the state, at
pr'ices fixed by 'the corpor-ation and subject to approval by the corporation at its hom·e office, and
who received a monthly salary for his services,
was held to he sufficient." Duluth Log Co. V·
Pulpwood a~. (1917) 137 Minn. 312, 163 NW 520.
The 'agent Fredrickson in this cas'e has represen'ted
the Walker Manufacturing Company and its predecessor,
who has done business in this st·ate on a continued basis
:ror a number of years. His function is not merely to solicit sales, although thaJt is a part of his dutie·s, but he is.
designated by the company as their agent here in 'the
state of Ut.ruh. While he has no authority to make any
binding contraclts on their behalf he represents their
busliness interests in th1s state. He n1ay be called upon
32
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by the company t1o eoHect accounts. He m~ay be called
upon by the company or their customers to investigalbe
complain't1s and make a report of the S!ame to the company. Tnere can be no doubt fuat under the CJases ~assign
ed his repres'entation is of such a character that the company is doting business under Rule 4 of the Ut:ah Rules of
Civil Procedure and that serVice upon Hadand Fredrickson is sufficient to confer jurisdicltion over the third
party defendant Walker Manufacturing Oompany upon
this court.
POINT NO. II.
SAID THIRD PARTY ·COMPLAINT DID STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED TO
THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT.

As was pOiill!ted out previously, the t!hird party defendant and appellant did not raise the polint that 'the
th'ird party CJomp~aint did not allege facts enti'tling the)
third p~rty plaintiff to relief a't the time the case was in
the District Court and this· appeal, which is from an interl'ocutory deci~sion of the court, was allowed only on
those matters raised under 'the first point. This fact
alone should dispose of the point; however, the following
authorities are cited should the court desire to review
them:
Rule 14(a) of 'the Ut ah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
"Before the service o.f his answeT ~a defendant
may move ex parte or, ·after the service of his
answer, on notice to 'tihe pJ!aint:iff, foT leave as a
third-party p~alintiff to serve a summons and com1
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plaint upon a person not a party to the action who
is or may be l'i'able to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is
granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter ooHed the
third party defendant, shall make his defenses to
the third party plaintiff's claim as provided in
Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third
party plaintiff ·and cross-claim's against other
third party defendants as provided in Rule 13.
The third-pa:rty defendant may also ass'ert any
cl·ati.m against the pl'aintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matte:r of the plaintiff's claim against the third
party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any
claim 'against 'tfue third party defendant arising
out of the trans,action or occurrence ~hat is the
subject mrutter of the plaintiff's claim agaJinstt the
iliird party p~a:intiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenS"es as prOvided ill Rule 12 and his counterclaims and crossclaims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party def·endanJt may p:r'oceed under this rule against any
person not a party to the action who is or may be
Ii1able to him for 'all or part of the claim made in
the action against the third-party defendant."
1

1

rt is ordinarily true, as was sraid by Justice Henri
Henri'Od in Hardm(Jffl. v. Matthews, (Utah) 262 P2 748,
't!hat j oiinlt !tort feasors cannot be interplead underr th!is
rule 'in tlhe abS'ence of a statute permitting contribution
between them. H01wever, this is not the situation in this
CJa.se.
In this caJs,e, the third party complaint is not based
upon any right of contributiOIJl between joint tort feaJS,ors
but on the right of indemnity.
1
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i~

.l

Assuming the facts of plaintiff'·s complaint and the
allegations of the third party complaint to be correct,
as we mus,t do at this point for the purpose of testing
the vtalidity of the pleadings, we are confronted with
this ·s~tuaJili.ron : The defendant and third par,ty p~amtiff
'Sold to the p}ain~iff 'a baby crib which wa1s defeetive.
Th~s defective condi~on should, if we are to believe the
plaintiff, have he.en known to the defendant and third
party p~aJinlffiff. If we stop alt this point, the:re· is no
ground for relief ·agalinst the third party deferrdant, the
manufacturer; however, if we assume, as alleged in the
thlird party complaint, that ·ifue defective c;orndiftion wrus
either the result of the manu:racturer's de~sign of the crib
or e:A'i!s.t~d .at the time the crib was sold by the manufacturer, ·and that the manuf'acturer should have known
of or discovered the condition, then the third party plaintiff would he en't'iltled to bring a suit against the third
party defendant for the damages suffered by re,asron of
said defective dersign or condition. Those dama.gers would
be me1a1sured by the recovery of the plaintiff in tlre first
actJirorn. The action agalinst the manuflacturer would no't
be one based on 'any right of contribution between joint
tort feasors. but rather would be one of indemnity based
upon the manuflaclturer's express or implied warranties
of s·ale. T'hii1s i's exactly the situation presented by the
pleadlin~s 'in th'i·s case except 'that the two actions have
been made <me under the procedure authorized by Rule
14('a) of 'tfue Utah Rules of Civil PI"ocedure.
Rul·e 14(a) of the Utah Rule's of Civil Procedure is
e1eactly the s'ame as Rule 14('a) 'of the Federal Rule1s. of
1
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Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Procedure, it
hrus heen heid that a defendant sued for dam-ages for the
negligent operation of an elevator may assert a claim
against •a tird party defendant for defective co!IliStructJion of sa£ety devices. Tomko v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., D.C.N.Y. 1943, 3 F.R.D. 31.
Under the F~ederal Rule, itt hrus al1so been held that
where pl·aintiff, injured while employed as grain shover
on a boat being unloaded at defendant's elevator in New
York, all'eged negligence in that a hook broke causing
plaintffi.ff to be struck by a shovel, def'endant wa.s entitled
to fil·e third party complaint ·against manufacturer of
hook, since manuf,acturer occupied po:sition of indemnitor
to def·endant and manufacturer's liability to defendant
was bas·ed upon breach of implied warranty. Tevington
v. International Milling Co·, D.C.N.Y. 1947, 71 Fed. Supp.
621.
An analogous s~ tua:tion exists where a retailer sued
by a consumer for breach of implied warranty of wholesomenesls or fitne1s1s of food, seeks to bring in as a party
defendant the wholesaler orr manufacturer from whom
the food was procured. There is an annotation in 24
ALR (2) 913, from which the f.oUowing is taken :
"While there wa·s no meaills under commonlaw procedure. whereby a defendant could bring
into the action a third person liable over to or
severaHy with the defendant upon the causes of
acUon being litigated, statutets and rules of practice have been enacted in a numbe·r of jurisdlictionJs providling that when a defendant shows fuat
some th'ird person, not then a party to the action,
may be nl:one lrable, or liable over to the defend1
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ant, or jointly and severally liable with him, on
the cause of action sued upon, t:he court may order
such person brought in a;s a par~ty defendant.
"There are a few ca:ses dealing with the specific question of the right of a retailer sued by a
consumer for breach of implied warranty of
whole1someness or fitne'S's of food or drink, to
bring in a1s party defendant the wholesaler or
manufacturer from whom the article was procured, but the trend establ1'shed by them :ts, clearly, that unde~r modern practice statutes such an
impleader rs proper.''
A number of cases from the jur~sdiction of North
Oarolina, New York and the United S't!a:tes OourtJs supporting this proposition are set out therein.
In DuRt'te Laundry, Inc. v. Washington Electric Co.,
Inc·, et al, 33 N.Y.S. 925, an action wrus brought against
the seller for breach of contract because of defects therein. The original defendant sought to implead a;s an additional defendant the cmnpany engaged t o inspect equipment before purchase thereof by original defendant from
the m·anufacturer. It was held:
''VVhere any party to an action sihows tlrat
some third person, no:t then a party to the action,
is or will be lrable to such party wh!oUy ·or in part
for the claim made against such party in the acti~on, the court . . . may order such person to be
brought in a;s a party to the action and dir·ect that
a supplemental summons and a pleading ... be
served upon such person." Subdiv. 2, Sec. 193,
Oivil Practice Act. "The Electric Company may
imple~ad the Irrspecfiom. Oompany as a party a1s its
cross-complaint shows a right to recover wholly
or in part any amount for which it i·s liable to
the Laundry Oompany."
1
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A diffe-rent approach was taken in McLa.ughlin v.
City of Syracuse, 56 N.Y.S. 594. There a city was sued
by a pedestrian struck by ice falling from the roof of a
building. The city moved to make the property owners
defendants. It was held the 1nofion should have been
granted. The court s·aid:
"We are well acquainted with the rule that a
joint t01rt-fe1asor ordin1arily may not be brought in
on the applicrution of a defendant unles's the plaintiff consents ... but there are exceptions to 'Such
ru1e and the exceptions are well expressed in
Truste,~s of Village of Oonandaigua v. Foster, 81
Hun. 147, 149, 150; 30 N.Y.S. 686, 687 ' ... First
where the party claiming indemn!ity has not been
guilty of ·any fiau1t except technically or construc'tively, rus where an innocent maste-r is held to re·spond f'or the tort of his servant, acting within
the scope of ID'S e1nployn1ent; or second, where
both partre's have been in fault, but nort in tili.e
same fiau1't, towards the person injured, and the
fau1t 'Orf the party from whom indemnity is claimed wa:s the primary and efficient cause of tihe
injury. Illu'strartions of the second clruss were
foun'd in cruses, like the present: 'of recovery
agia!ihst municipalities for obstructions to the
highways cau'sed by private persons. The fault
of the latter rs the creation of the nuisance; th'at
of 'the former, the failure to re.move it, in the exercise of 'iijs duty to care for the safety of public
s'treerts. The first was, a positive tort, and the efficient c·ause of the injury complained ·of; the latter,
the negative tort of neglect to act upon notice,
expres·s or implied.'"
In the case at bar, the thlrd party defendant, assuming the aUegations orf 'tihe complaints to be true, would he
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required to indemnify the defendant for any damages
the plaintiff migHt recover ag~ainsrt defendant. ills, the
iiliird party defendant's negligence was t!he p01sltive and
the effective cause of the injury. The negligence of defendant wa;s negative; that is, the failure to discover
the defec't.

CONCLUSION

Ji.

Thus it is seen, under the plea:dings the third party
defend!an:t would be liable to the defendant for any damage plaintiff might recover, nort 0n the theory of constructiion but on tili:e theory of inde:Illllity. The third
party is 'therefore a proper party to be brought into
the action under Rule 14(a) of the Ut!ah Rule s of Civil
Procedure. Service was had upon the third party defendant by service upon h~s agent Hadand Fredrickson,
I
and the court 'has jurisdiction over h'im.
1
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Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondent
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